



Open Analysis:  
**Did We Read It Wrong, Or Did Anybody  
Notice that Bukalapak.com is About to  
Acquire This MVP\* Startup for Half of Its  
Own Market Cap?**

23 March 2022

*\*Minimum Viable Product*

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# 01

## Executive Summary

# For Your Information

This article is a sequel of our earlier IPO Note about Bukalapak.com issued on 27 July 2021, few days before its IPO listing date. Reader is advised to read our earlier note for a better reading experience.

This IPO Note was featured at LinkedIn News: “Not all unicorn IPOs soar”

Please access the following page to download:  
<https://nilzoncapital.com/2021/07/27/ipo-note-pt-bukalapak-tbk/>

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Capital*

## *Nilzon Capital* IPO Note

Bukalapak IPO: Should we pay this much for getting into the hype?

July 27, 2021

### Key Highlights

Despite its long history of growth, PT Bukalapak.com Tbk. (IDX:BUKA) is yet to prove its success in taping Indonesia's ever-growing e-commerce market. Its lack of market share and lack of product differentiation stand as primary challenges to making sense of the demanding valuation. We identify few of many considerable risks associated with an investment in BUKA so that investors can better judge their fair valuation towards BUKA and preventing paying too much for getting into the hype.

### Company Description

BUKA is legally founded in September 2011 in Bandung by Achmad Zaky, Nugroho Herucahyono, and M Fajrin Rasyid, all colleague living in the same dorm room while studying at ITB and now all three are no longer serving BUKA. BUKA is currently planning to lists 25% of its shares post-IPO in IDX and raise up to IDR22tn, all proceed will goes to working capital use. BUKA revenue segments include marketplace, online to offline, and wholesale. The company operates and serves Indonesian market only.

Readers shall not take/use this IPO Note as an investment advice. Please do your own proper research.  
See important disclosure at the end of this document. Investing involves risks.  
Tersedia dalam Bahasa Indonesia. Kunjungi nilzoncapital.com/buka untuk mengunduh.

### Ballpark Indicative Valuation

(P/S Ratio vs Global Peers)

IDR 270 to IDR 759

per share, see valuation segment for details

### Ownership Post-IPO

| Name                 | Percentage (%) |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Kreatif Media Karya  | 23.93          |
| API (Hong Kong) Inv. | 13.05          |
| Archipelago Inv.     | 9.45           |
| Others               | 28.57          |
| Public               | 25.00          |


### IPO Schedule

|                         |            |
|-------------------------|------------|
| Effective Statement     | 26 July    |
| Public Offering         | 27-30 July |
| Allotment               | 3 August   |
| Electronic Distribution | 5 August   |
| Refund                  | 5 August   |
| Listing at IDX          | 6 August   |

# Overview of BUKA

- **PT Bukalapak.com Tbk.** (IDX: BUKA) is one of Indonesia's surviving pioneer in ecommerce business founded in 2011. Its business primarily focuses on ecommerce platform, bulk selling, and – after its IPO – investing in joint ventures and associates.
- In 6 August 2021, BUKA listed its shares in IDX and set record for the largest fundraising ever in the domestic market at that time, raking in a total of IDR 22 trillion from the public.
- The IPO use of proceeds was to support 100% working capital for BUKA and subsidiaries, which later changed by trimming the working capital allocation for BUKA and reroute the proceeds for investment to JV and associates ( $\frac{1}{3}$  of total proceeds).
- BUKA IPO was getting a lot of attention from the public, especially retail investors. The total number of shareholders as of February 2022 is 119,379, one of the most in IDX, despite down from 132,082 in the first month following the listing date.
- Since BUKA is now no longer in a pure marketplace business, we try to identify the risks & reward of investment in BUKA and (again) try to make sense of its valuation.
- At this article, **cutoff date for market data and screenshots are as of 18 March 2022**, unless stated otherwise.

## BUKA Stock Price Since IPO



Source: Financial Report, Yahoo Finance, IDX


|                                        |              |
|----------------------------------------|--------------|
| Enterprise Value (EV)                  | IDR4.04 trn  |
| Market Cap                             | IDR27.62 trn |
| 2021 Net Revenues (Analysts Consensus) | IDR1.93 trn  |
| 2022 Net Revenues (Analysts Consensus) | IDR3.08 trn  |
| Market Cap / 2022 Est. Net Revenues    | 8.97x        |
| Employees (Sept 2021)                  | 2,019        |

We use market data as of 18 March 2022 and financial data as of 30 Sept 2021. Analysts Consensus and estimation data surveyed by Refinitiv. Low enterprise value due to high cash balance as of 30 Sept 2021, the latest available financial report.

# Is LQ-45 supposed to perform better without BUKA?

- Starting 29 September 2021, BUKA is included in several major indexes at IDX: LQ45, IDX30, and IDX80 as a result of IDX “fast-entry” index inclusion policy.
- It replaced SMRA in LQ45, TKIM in IDX30, and LINK in IDX80 simultaneously.
- Since the start of its LQ45 inclusion on 28 September 2021, BUKA share has dropped significantly, indicating a **-70.32%** loss as of 18 March 2022.
- On the contrary, **SMRA, which was kicked out from LQ45 to make room for BUKA, only lost -4.94%** of its value during the same time frame. This is indicating that despite the unfortunate removal, SMRA still outperforms BUKA by **+65.38%**.

## LQ45 Relative Performance 29 Sep 2021 - 18 Mar 2022



Source: IDX, Yahoo Finance

# 02

**Keeping Track of the Country's  
Biggest IPO**

# Post-IPO Execution: Change in the use of IPO proceeds

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- On the evening of **1 December 2021**, BUKA surprised the market by announcing its next EGMS with agenda to **change its IPO proceeds allocation**.
- The proposal was to significantly cut working capital funding for Bukalapak.com and rerouting the fund for acquisition/investment in JV or associates.
- The announcement happened only 4 months after the first listing date, which caught many investors – who already suffers **-40%** loss since IPO price (or **-62%** from its peak) – off-guard.
- The change in the use of proceeds is not prohibited by law, as long as the shareholders agree to the proposal, which they did in the EGMS. It is, in fact, beneficial to the shareholders as long as the management is able to hunt the best investment opportunities that can add value to BUKA shareholders.

## Media Coverage



Source: Deal Street Asia

## Proposed Use of IPO Proceeds (Before)

| Use of Proceeds               | (%) Allocation | IDR (bn)      |
|-------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| Bukalapak.com Working Capital | 66             | 14,454        |
| Buka Mitra Indonesia          | 15             | 3,285         |
| Buka Usaha Indonesia          | 15             | 3,285         |
| Buka Investasi Bersama        | 1              | 219           |
| Buka Pengadaan Indonesia      | 1              | 219           |
| Bukalapak Pte. Ltd.           | 1              | 219           |
| Five Jack                     | 1              | 219           |
| <b>Total</b>                  | <b>100</b>     | <b>21,900</b> |

Source: Company

## Proposed Use of IPO Proceeds (After)


| Use of Proceeds               | (%) Allocation | IDR (bn)      |
|-------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| Bukalapak.com Working Capital | 33             | 7,227         |
| Buka Mitra Indonesia          | 15             | 3,285         |
| Buka Usaha Indonesia          | 15             | 3,285         |
| Buka Investasi Bersama        | 1              | 219           |
| Buka Pengadaan Indonesia      | 1              | 219           |
| Bukalapak Pte. Ltd.           | 1              | 219           |
| Five Jack                     | 1              | 219           |
| Acquisition & Investment      | 33             | 7,227         |
| <b>Total</b>                  | <b>100</b>     | <b>21,900</b> |

# Post-IPO Execution: Change in the use of IPO proceeds (cont'd)

- Just look at the chart on your right.



Proposed Use of IPO Proceeds



Source: Company

# Post-IPO Execution: President Director and Commissioner step down


- **Just four weeks** after the use of IPO proceeds news, the public was again surprised by another significant event regarding BUKA management personnel.
- This time, President Director M. Rachmat Kaimuddin resigned after taking BUKA public to pursue new career in the government.
- Few months prior Mr. Rachmat's, one of the commissioner Mr. Lau Eng Boon, tender his resignation for retirement.
- The stock jump **+5.12%** following the resignation news.
- As of the writing of this article, the management change is as follows:

▼ Out:

- Lau Eng Boon
- M Rachmat Kaimuddin

▲ In:

- Willix Halim (Promotion)
- Howard Nugraha Gani
- Victor Putra Lesmana




The screenshot shows a news article from TechInAsia. The header includes the TechInAsia logo and navigation links: NEWS, JOBS, COMPANIES, EVENTS, ABOUT, ADVERTISE. Below this are more links: PREMIUM, VISUALS, VIDEOS, NEWSLETTERS, CATEGORIES, and MARKETS. The article is by Aditya Hadi Pratama, dated 5 Jan 2022, with a 2-minute read time. The title is 'Bukalapak CEO to step down months after taking firm public (Update)'. The sub-headline reads: 'Update (January 5, 5 pm): Updated with details on Kaimuddin's replacement.' The main text states: 'Muhammad Rachmat Kaimuddin, the CEO of recently listed Indonesian ecommerce major Bukalapak, submitted his resignation letter to the firm on December 28.' The source is cited as 'Source: Tech In Asia'.

# Post-IPO Execution: Acquisition of Allo Bank

- The year of 2021 was the year for digital banks. Share price of aspiring digital banks soars following sequence of secondary public offerings.
- This digital bank fever was in part caused by the **minimum capital requirement asked by OJK** in order for banks to be able to operate branchless banking on the back of decent technology infrastructure and adequate capital.
- BUKA has join the bandwagon by investing in **Allo Bank (IDX: BBHI)**, an aspiring digital bank beneficially-owned by one of the Indonesian conglomerate, CT Corp.
- The deal was sealed by exercising pre-emptive rights from CT Corp's Mega Corpora worth **IDR 1.2 trillion**.
- BUKA stock closed lower **-6%** on the date of announcement.

Relative Stock Performance 1 Jan 2021 - 18 Mar 2022 of Notable Indonesian Digital Banks



Source: Yahoo Finance

As of 18 March 2022, BUKA investment in Allo Bank is worth IDR 13.55 trillion. If BUKA paid no premium to Mega Corpora for the acquisition of pre-emptive rights, BUKA gain on paper on Allo Bank is around IDR 12.35 trillion or **+1,029%**. In other words, **49%** of BUKA current market cap is contributed by its investment in Allo Bank.

# Post-IPO Execution: Acquisition of Allo Fresh

- Shortly after completing Allo Bank investment, BUKA made another headline by announcing investment in **Allo Fresh** by forming JV with Trans Retail (also CT Corp's) and Berani Investment Pte. Ltd (an investment arm of Singaporean private equity firm Growthem Capital).
- Allo Fresh primary business is to trade daily necessities online through a platform called AlloFresh. The company competes directly in the already-overcrowded grocery space together with GoMart (GoTo company), GrabMart (Grab company), Sayurbox, Segari, TaniHub, KlikIndomaret, Dropezy, and Astro.
- FYI, just about one week after Allo Fresh announcement, CNN reported that two US-based ultra-fast delivery startups (Fridge No More and Buyk) shut down in the same week. Brittain Ladd, a food supply chain consultant and former worker of Amazon, said in the news **"The worst business model ever created was rapid grocery delivery."**
- BUKA investment in Allo Fresh is **IDR 777.78 billion**. The stock closed **-4.71%** lower in the day following the investment news.

Bloomberg

## Indonesia Tycoon Teams Up With Bukalapak for Online Grocery Push

- Chairul Tanjung's CT Corp. to launch AlloFresh with partners
- Companies plan to invest \$70 million in grocery venture



Workers load a delivery vehicle with orders at a Bukalapak.com warehouse in West Java. Photographer: Dimas Ardian/Bloomberg

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
Source: Bloomberg

CNN BUSINESS Markets Tech Media Success Perspectives Videos

## Two ultra-fast delivery startups shut down in one week



By Sara Ashley O'Brien, CNN Business  
Updated 2319 GMT (0719 HKT) March 11, 2022



TOP STORIES  
Opinion:  
time to r  
Netflix a  
expandi




Source: CNN Business

# Post-IPO Execution: Notable acquisitions

| Date      | Company/Subsidiary           | Action              | Business Activity                          | Transaction Value | Nominal Value |
|-----------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 12-Aug-21 | PT Ayo Tech Indonesia        | Acquisition         | Trading and services                       | IDR 8.16 bn       | IDR 0.15 bn   |
| 02-Sep-21 | PT Onstock Solusi Indonesia  | Acquisition         | Web portal and commercial digital platform | IDR 1.45 bn       | IDR 0.20 bn   |
| 28-Sep-21 | PT Buka Usaha Indonesia      | Capital Enlargement | Web portal and commercial digital platform | IDR 15.00 bn      | IDR 15.00 bn  |
| 12-Oct-21 | PT Bina Nusa Indonesia       | Establishment       | Retail trade, not cars and motorcycle      | N/A               | N/A           |
| 12-Oct-21 | PT Buka Mitra Indonesia      | Capital Enlargement | Web portal and commercial digital platform | IDR 527.00 bn     | IDR 527.00 bn |
| 02-Nov-21 | PT Kokatto Teknologi Global  | Acquisition         | Trading, services and industry             | IDR 90.09 bn      | N/A           |
| 03-Nov-21 | PT Global Digital Indokreasi | Establishment       | Retail trade, not cars and motorcycle & IT | N/A               | N/A           |
| 04-Nov-21 | PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi    | Acquisition         | Private education, private tutoring        | USD 1.00 bn       | N/A           |
| 16-Nov-21 | PT Michael Global Digital    | Establishment       | Retail trade                               | N/A               | N/A           |
| 18-Jan-22 | Allo bank                    | Acquisition         | Digital bank and services                  | IDR 1,193.96 bn   | IDR 249.78 bn |
| 02-Mar-22 | Allo Fresh Indonesia         | Acquisition         | E-grocery platform                         | IDR 777.78 bn     | IDR 77.53 bn  |

Source: Company

- As far as we're concern, BUKA is yet to seal **one fantastic deal** that can change the game and prove the skeptics wrong.
- **Oh...wait! What about PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi \$1 billion investment???**



# 03

**Commitment to Acquire BTB for  
\$1 Billion?**

# FYI, \$1 billion is half of BUKA current market cap

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- Based on information available in the subsequent events, **BUKA is currently committed to purchase PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi (“BTB”)**, an Indonesian firm self-described as private education, tutoring, and digital business.
- The acquiring companies are KKI and BUK, both 100% effectively owned by BUKA.
- The deal was signed on **4 November 2021**, three months after the IPO and one month prior the decision to change of use of IPO proceeds.
- At that time, BUKA market cap was around IDR 70 trillion (equivalent to around USD 5 billion), **compared to today’s market cap of IDR 28 trillion (USD 1.93 billion).**
- **If we read this right** and there is no error in our interpretation and/or error in the text verbatim, we consider this acquisition to be relatively massive, remembering the deal size **(\$1 billion) is about half of both BUKA current market cap and BUKA book value of equity.** If we were later proven wrong, we’re sorry, but this disclosure is worth to discuss.
- If you can read our mind: Is \$1 billion just an on-paper valuation? Is BUKA about to pay BTB for \$1 billion or any amount lower than that? How do they finance the deal? What about the terms of acquisition? Is it involving cash or share swap? What are the reasons for the acquisition? How they come up with the \$1 billion valuation?

## Screen Capture from BUKA 3Q21 Financial Report

### 39. EVENTS AFTER THE REPORTING DATE (continued)

#### Acquisition of PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi

On November 4, 2021, KKI and BUK signed a share sale and purchase agreement with PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi (“BTB”), a company incorporated in Indonesia for USD1,000,000,000 to acquire 100% ownership or a total of 11,340 shares. Based on BTB’s Shareholders Decision on November 5, 2021, notarized by Notarial Deed No. 33 dated November 5, 2021 of Aulia Taufani, S.H. and The notarial deed has obtained approval from the Minister of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia in its Letter of Acceptance letter of No. AHU-AH.01.03-0475880 dated November 22, 2021, BTB’s shareholders among others, approved the takeover of all shareholders’ shares to KKI of the amount 4,000 shares of series A, 4,339 shares of series B and 3,000 shares of series C and BUK of the amount 1 share of series B.


BTB engages mainly in activities related to business in the other fields of private education, social activities in work social institutions, private tutoring and counseling education, trading application development activities via the internet, other computer programming activities, web portals and/or digital platforms with commercial purposes, business consulting and business brokerage activities and advertising.

Source: IDX

## A quick Google search about BTB shows us the following:

- There are **not many results** you can get by searching “belajar tumbuh berbagi” in Google.
- However, the top search leads us to **Bolu.id website**, a community-based business seeking to help Indonesian people to sell online and familiarize sellers with the use of ecommerce platform.
- Further down to the site, we find that “**Bolu**” is a brand name of **PT Belajar Tumbuh Berbagi (BTB)**, the very same company that BUKA is about to acquire.
- FYI, Bolu’s Office #2 address is in the same building with BUKA, indicating that the company may already begin to integrate their business.
- Thus, we assume that BTB is indeed Bolu, or at least affiliated.
- Bolu is, according to themselves, acronym of “*Belajar Online Yuk*” (Let’s Learn Online).

### Screen Capture from Google Search



### Screen Capture from Bolu.id Website



Source: Google, Bolu.id, accessed 18 March 2022

# However, BUKA is yet to disclose further details on this deal, since we find no disclosure of BTB deal around that date

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- 404 Not Found.
- We are yet to find any clue on how this deal was valued, the source of funds to finance such massive deal, and the terms and agreements that may bind BUKA; in order to make a fair and objective assessment on the deal.
- Reader is advised to keep updated with any information that BUKA management may issue after the date of this article.

## Screen Capture from IDX Disclosure Page (BUKA), Showing No Disclosure on BTB

01 December 2021 17:12:55

### Invitation of Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders [BUKA ]

Attachment:

20211201\_BUKA\_Pemanggilan RUPS\_31005618\_lamp2.pdf

20211201\_BUKA\_Pemanggilan RUPS\_31005618\_lamp1.pdf

16 November 2021 09:09:14

### Announcement of General Meeting of Shareholders [BUKA ]

Attachment:

20211116\_BUKA\_Pengumuman RUPS\_30992746\_lamp1.pdf

15 November 2021 20:25:09

### Submission of Material Transaction/Changes in Main Business Activities [BUKA ]

Attachment:

20211115\_BUKA\_Rencana Transaksi Material diatas 50% Ekuitas\_30992708\_lamp1.pdf

09 November 2021 20:51:48

### Advertisement Submission [BUKA ]

Attachment:

20211109\_BUKA\_Penyampaian Bukti Iklan\_30991476\_lamp2.pdf

20211109\_BUKA\_Penyampaian Bukti Iklan\_30991476\_lamp1.pdf

08 November 2021 19:43:32

### Material Information or Facts Report Disclosure of Information on the Commencement of Exercise Period of Management and Employee Stock Option Program (MESOP) of PT Bukalapak.com Tbk [BUKA ]

Attachment:

20211108\_BUKA\_Laporan Informasi dan Fakta Material\_30991087\_lamp2.pdf

20211108\_BUKA\_Laporan Informasi dan Fakta Material\_30991087\_lamp1.pdf

04 November 2021 14:35:29

### Monthly Report of Securities Holders Registration [BUKA ]

Attachment:


Source: IDX, accessed 18 March 2022

# Instead, we find that one of the Co-Founders of Bolu posted a public thread that may hint the acquisition on Twitter

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- As far as we concern, the deal of this relative size is subject to **shareholders approval and other procedures** stated in POJK 17/2020 about material transaction and POJK 31/2015 about public disclosure, but maybe there are some critical information that we missed.
- Instead, we found out that **one of Bolu Co-Founders posted a picture that may hint to the situation of the room where and when the agreement was signed**, further disclosing to their followers about the past story of Bolu and **hinting the future that they expect the company will be doing.** The date of the Co-Founder's post was at **6 November 2021**, two days after the signing date stated in the subsequent events.

## Screen Capture from the Co-Founder's Twitter Page




Source:

<https://twitter.com/cartnesia/status/1456806018030071808?s=21>, accessed 18 March 2022


# Our further observation hints that BTB product is likely still in the MVP phase

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
## Screen Capture from LinkedIn




## Screen Capture from Google Play



## Screen Capture from Google Play (2)



## Screen Capture from Instagram




Source: LinkedIn, Google Play, Instagram, accessed 18 March 2022

# We tried Bolu.id services for few days

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- We are so curious and enthusiastic about this acquisition, so we believe that it may be a good idea to try the services offered by Bolu.id.
- At first, we landed on Bolu.id page and were asked to signup using our WhatsApp number.
- Then, we were asked to choose the upcoming webinar. But, there were no webinar scheduled at that time :(
- Luckily, Bolu offered us to join previous classes, which (of course) we accept!
- After some technical stuffs, we were ended up joining a public WhatsApp group.
- For few days, we observe what is really happening, and mostly it's about how you solve technical problems about some online stuffs and how to do online merchandising.
- We left the group to focus on this report.

## Screen Capture from Bolu WhatsApp Group




Source: Bolu, WhatsApp, accessed 18 March 2022


# Besides Bolu, further Google search about BTB shows us another upstart “Ceri”

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- BTB is likely managing multiple brands with different business models. In fact, we found that another upstart “Ceri” is operating under the same company name, BTB.
- Both Ceri and Bolu shared the same office building at Metropolitan Tower, South Jakarta.
- Based on our observation on Ceri website, the company is likely to operate career advise and job hunting/advertising business.
- In one of their Instagram post, Ceri described their mission to help job hunters:




## Ceri Trademark on Ministry of Law Page



Source: [pdk-indonesia.dgip.go.id](https://pdk-indonesia.dgip.go.id)

## Ceri Instagram Page, First Post at February 2022




Source: Instagram

## Ceri Landing Page

ceri

### Langkah Awal Untuk Memulai Karir Kamu

Aplikasi Kerja Khusus SMA, SMK, dan Magang



Source: Ceri.app

## Ceri Contact Details on Website



Source: Ceri.app

# In 2020, BTB registered "Ngolshop" trademark and web domain

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- The furthest we can observe about BTB is when the company registered "Ngolshop" brand in the trademark registry in November 2020 and registered domain name on August 2020.
- WaybackMachine detected earliest activity of the website is at 2016.
- However, Ngolshop seems to ceased operation since the web page is no longer accessible and the latest post on their Instagram page was on June 2021.
- Ngolshop business was likely about online store management and bookkeeping.

## Ngolshop Trademark on Ministry of Law Page

Pangkalan Data Kekayaan Intelektual

Merek: ngolshop

Kembali ke pencarian

No. Pendaftaran: IDM000941438  
Tgl. Pendaftaran: 2021-12-31

ngolshop

Status: (TM) Didaftar

Detail

|                                           |                                            |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| NGMOR PENGUMUMAN<br>BRM2064A              | TANGGAL PENGUMUMAN<br>2020-11-23           |
| NGMOR PERMOHONAN<br>DID2020071373         | TANGGAL PENERIMAAN<br>2020-11-18           |
| TANGGAL DIMULAI PELINDUNGAN<br>2020-11-18 | TANGGAL BERAKHIR PELINDUNGAN<br>2030-11-18 |

Publikasi  
Publikasi A

Source: [pdk-indonesia.dgip.go.id](https://pdk-indonesia.dgip.go.id)

## Ngolshop Instagram Page

Instagram

ngolshop.official

28 posts 520 followers 33 following

Pembukaan otomatis olshop!  
👉 Bikin rekapan mudah  
👉 Cetak label pengiriman  
👉 Laporan profit instan  
👉 Website olshop instan  
Pakai GRATIS daftar disini  
[ngolshop.com](https://ngolshop.com)

Followed by haibolu

Source: Instagram

## Ngolshop.com Internet Archive

INTERNET ARCHIVE Explore more than 667 billion web pages at <https://ngolshop.com/>

Calendar Collections Changes Summary Site

98 URLs have been captured for this URL prefix.

| URL                                                                                                                                               | DATE-TYPE                | FROM         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| <a href="https://ngolshop.com/login">https://ngolshop.com/login</a>                                                                               | text/html                | Jan 16, 2021 |
| <a href="https://ngolshop.com/login?aff=haibolu">https://ngolshop.com/login?aff=haibolu</a>                                                       | text/html                | Jan 16, 2021 |
| <a href="https://ngolshop.com/indonesiashop">https://ngolshop.com/indonesiashop</a>                                                               | text/html                | Jan 17, 2021 |
| <a href="https://ngolshop.com/galerihjabid">https://ngolshop.com/galerihjabid</a>                                                                 | text/html                | Jan 16, 2021 |
| <a href="https://ngolshop.com/Pempeknona99">https://ngolshop.com/Pempeknona99</a>                                                                 | text/html                | Jan 16, 2021 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/favicon.ico">http://ngolshop.com/favicon.ico</a>                                                                     | image/vnd.microsoft.icon | Oct 27, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/wp-content/themes/NewsMag/NewsMag">http://ngolshop.com/80/wp-content/themes/NewsMag/NewsMag</a>                   | text/html                | Aug 21, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/kerpik-bekicot-sate-bekicot-kuliner-kadri/">http://ngolshop.com/80/kerpik-bekicot-sate-bekicot-kuliner-kadri/</a> | text/html                | Aug 21, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/author/yogiarlo_3849u40/">http://ngolshop.com/80/author/yogiarlo_3849u40/</a>                                     | text/html                | Aug 21, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml">http://ngolshop.com/80/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml</a>                               | text/xml                 | Aug 20, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/comments/feed/">http://ngolshop.com/80/comments/feed/</a>                                                         | application/xml          | Aug 20, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/category/elektronik/">http://ngolshop.com/80/category/elektronik/</a>                                             | text/html                | Aug 20, 2016 |
| <a href="http://ngolshop.com/80/category/barang-unik/">http://ngolshop.com/80/category/barang-unik/</a>                                           | text/html                | Aug 20, 2016 |

Source: WaybackMachine

## Ngolshop Domain Registry Page

who.is Search for domains or IP addresses... Premium Domains Transfer Features

ngolshop.com  
whois information

Whois DNS Records Diagnostics

cache expires in 20 hours, 42 minutes and 28 seconds  
refresh

Registrar Info

|              |                                                                                                                                      |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name         | PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com                                                                                              |
| Whois Server | whois.publicdomainregistry.com                                                                                                       |
| Referral URL | www.publicdomainregistry.com                                                                                                         |
| Status       | clientTransferProhibited <a href="https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited">https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited</a> |

Important Dates

|               |            |
|---------------|------------|
| Expires On    | 2022-08-18 |
| Registered On | 2020-08-18 |
| Updated On    | 2021-08-18 |

Name Servers

|                 |                 |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| ns1.dewaweb.com | 94.237.76.251   |
| ns2.dewaweb.com | 103.152.242.120 |



Source: Whois

# There are some other notable \$1 billion upstarts in Indonesia

## Screen Capture from LinkedIn and JobStreet

1. Gojek (in 2016)
2. Tokopedia (in 2017)
3. Traveloka (in 2017)
4. Bukalapak (in 2018)
5. Ovo (in 2019) - 1,661 employees
6. J&T Express (in 2021) - 5,864 employees, Indonesia
7. Ajaib (in 2021) - 387 employees
8. Kopi Kenangan (in 2021) - 1,500 employees
9. OnlinePajak (in 2021) - 84 employees
10. **BTB (at BUKA acquisition in December 2021) (Bolu + Ceri) – 50 employees?**

Source: Kompas.com, LinkedIn




Source: LinkedIn, JobStreet,  
accessed 18 March 2022

# Is BUKA's cash balance sufficient to finance this deal?

- Back to the breakdown of the use of IPO proceeds, **capital allocation for investment and acquisitions are IDR 7.23 trillion**, with **IDR 6.68 trillion remain yet to be used** after Allo Bank and Allo Fresh acquisitions.
- If BUKA is about to purchase BTB for \$1 billion (IDR 14.30 trillion), **we don't see BUKA cash balance is sufficient even just to cover half of the proposed transaction.**
- Thus, BUKA may need to explore external financing, reallocate its use of IPO proceeds (again), or use other method to get additional funding for BTB acquisition.

Proposed Use of IPO Proceeds



**BTB shareholders be like if the acquisition is settled in cash:**

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
# 04

**Mandatory Lockup Expiration:  
Now What?**

# Trading volume was relatively quiet in the second month following the IPO, but has been picking up near the lock-up expiration date scheduled on 26 March 2022

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**BUKA Weekly Average Transaction Volume, with Share Price in the Background Starting 18 Aug 2021 (Not Included in the Vertical Axis)**



**Event 1:** Multiple attempts to *bottom fishing* after price dropped below the IPO price for the first time, resulting in a surge in trading volume.

**Event 2:** Selling pressure after Q3 earnings announcement (29 November 2021).

**Event 3:** Market rout after Russia declared war on Ukraine while Nasdaq entered bear market, resulting in BUKA shares making multiple new lows. However, the average trading volume has been picking up for the past few weeks.

\*) We define % of Adjusted Free Float as a percentage of weekly trading volume divided by total amount of IPO shares and unlocked shares from existing private investors. We assume private investors have released their unlocked shares at the listing date, which may not be accurate. Source: Yahoo Finance.

# Investors who participated in BUKA late-stage private funding rounds may likely to face a similar complex situation



## Indicative Weighted Average Entry Price of Private Funding Rounds

| Year | Investor                   | Indicative Weighted Avg Entry Price* | Indicative Floating Loss @272/share |
|------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2019 | Domestic mutual fund       | 584                                  | -53%                                |
|      | Domestic corporate 1       |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign corporate 1        |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign fund 1             |                                      |                                     |
| 2020 | Foreign corporate 2        | 535                                  | -49%                                |
|      | Foreign corporate 2        |                                      |                                     |
|      | Domestic corporate 1       |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign corporate 1        |                                      |                                     |
| 2021 | Foreign corporate 3        | 410                                  | -34%                                |
|      | Foreign omnibus            |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign corporate 4        |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign fund 2             |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign venture capital 1  |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign individual         |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign omnibus 2          |                                      |                                     |
|      | Domestic venture capital 1 |                                      |                                     |
|      | Domestic venture capital 2 |                                      |                                     |
|      | Foreign venture capital 2  |                                      |                                     |
|      | In-kind contribution       |                                      |                                     |

*\*) Indicative average entry price is calculated by tracking equity movement in the Statement of Changes in Equity. We provide no guarantee that the stated numbers are accurate. Actual numbers may differ materially due to different investment circumstances.*

*\*) We assume all investors in the same class for a particular financing round are entitled to the same indicative average entry price, which may not be accurate depending on the individual terms and conditions set during the private funding round.*

*Source: Prospectus, Financial Report, IDX*

Using available information in the prospectus, we attempted to calculate indicative weighted-average entry price for pre-IPO investors dated back to 2019.

Assuming nobody sold the shares up to date, we found that most of the pre-IPO investors are likely to face floating loss ranging from **-34% to -53%** at IDR 272/share (BUKA closing price as of 17 March 2022), depending on respective terms and conditions during the funding round. This is because on average, the entry price was ranging from IDR 410/share to IDR 584/share. This is for informational purpose only. We provide no guarantee that the numbers are accurate due to multiple circumstances and thus please take it with a grain of salt.

# BUKA is still bonded to buy back shares from, or issue additional shares to one of its investor for free if...

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- Based on information available in the prospectus and further updated with financial statement disclosure issued on 29 November 2021, BUKA stated that the Company is in contract with one of its investor-supplier to meet certain cloud services spending goal by the pre-defined deadline in exchange for capital injection (the spending goal is twice as much as the amount invested by this investor).
- BUKA is subject to obligation to buyback or issue additional shares to this investor-supplier if the Company fails to meet the spending goals by the pre-determined deadline. Thus, the risk of dilution and financial loss arising from this agreement still persist up to the date of 3Q 2021 financial report issuance.
- The management believe that they will meet the goal over the relevant time period.

## **Agreement with Naver Corporation**

*In connection with the issuance of series G shares in 2021, the Company entered into an agreement with Naver Corporation ("Naver") which has been amended in May 2021, whereby: (i) Naver purchased US\$10 million of series G shares; and (ii) the Company undertook to enter into a cloud services agreement with Naver subject to agreed terms and conditions. As of the date completion of this consolidated financial statements, the cloud services agreement has yet to be entered into by the parties. The terms of the company agreement with Naver Corporation provide that if and to the extent the Company do not enter into a cloud services agreement with Naver by November 16, 2021 or such later date as agreed by the parties, the Company may be obligated to buy back certain series G shares (or in equivalent number of shares after the Company's shares are being stock split) from Naver Corporation up to US\$10 million.*

*In addition, if the purchase of cloud services from Naver over the term of the agreement is less than US\$20 million, the Company may be obligated to either: (i) pay refund of the unrealized contract value to Naver up to USD10 million and will receive certain series G shares (or in equivalent number of shares after the Company's shares are being stock split) from Naver without any payment consideration from the Company or (ii) issue additional shares to Naver in the amount of the unrealized contract value up to USD10 million. The number of shares to be returned by or issued to Naver will be subject to certain adjustments pursuant to the definition of 'fair market value' in the agreement. Naver will have the sole discretion to option for either alternatives. The Company currently expect spending on cloud services from Naver over the relevant time period will likely reach US\$20 million and will not be obligated to buyback any such series G shares (or in equivalent number of shares after the Company's shares are being stock split).*

# 05

## Revisiting BUKA Relative Valuation

# Which measurement is suitable for BUKA valuation?

- Depending on the situation and business model, valuation for ecommerce companies may vary.
- To complicate things further, **most of the ecommerce businesses are still losing money** and yet to make any profits; BUKA is no exception.
- **Even for Amazon.com Inc., their operation outside of North America was still in the red**, indicating a challenging ecommerce landscape in the developing markets.
- In the ASEAN region, **Sea Limited's Shopee business has just booked its first meaningful contribution to the gross profits after 7 years in existence.**
- Further closer to the domestic market, GoTo has just disclosed their IPO prospectus, showing **Tokopedia** still making a loss.
- While discounted cash flow model may not be useful due to ultra-long term nature of BUKA business, we see **Price/Sales Ratio** to be the most effective approach, especially when comparing listed companies with similar business model.

## Amazon.com Inc. Revenue Segments

Information on reportable segments and reconciliation to consolidated net income (loss) is as follows (in millions):

|                         | Year Ended December 31, |            |            |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------|------------|
|                         | 2019                    | 2020       | 2021       |
| <b>North America</b>    |                         |            |            |
| Net sales               | \$ 170,773              | \$ 236,282 | \$ 279,833 |
| Operating expenses      | 163,740                 | 227,631    | 272,562    |
| Operating income        | \$ 7,033                | \$ 8,651   | \$ 7,271   |
| <b>International</b>    |                         |            |            |
| Net sales               | \$ 74,723               | \$ 104,412 | \$ 127,787 |
| Operating expenses      | 76,416                  | 103,695    | 128,711    |
| Operating income (loss) | \$ (1,693)              | \$ 717     | \$ (924)   |
| <b>AWS</b>              |                         |            |            |
| Net sales               | \$ 35,026               | \$ 45,370  | \$ 62,202  |
| Operating expenses      | 25,825                  | 31,839     | 43,670     |
| Operating income        | \$ 9,201                | \$ 13,531  | \$ 18,532  |
| <b>Consolidated</b>     |                         |            |            |
| Net sales               | \$ 280,522              | \$ 386,064 | \$ 469,822 |
| Operating expenses      | 265,981                 | 363,165    | 444,943    |
| Operating income        | 14,541                  | 22,899     | 24,879     |

Source: Amazon.com Inc., 2021 10-K


## Sea Limited Income Statement

|                               | For the Three Months ended December 31, |             | For the Year ended December 31, |             |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
|                               | 2020                                    | 2021        | 2020                            | 2021        |
|                               | \$                                      | \$          | \$                              | \$          |
| <b>Revenue</b>                |                                         |             |                                 |             |
| Service revenue               |                                         |             |                                 |             |
| Digital Entertainment         | 693,362                                 | 1,415,044   | 2,015,972                       | 4,320,013   |
| E-commerce and other services | 656,566                                 | 1,482,665   | 1,777,330                       | 4,564,617   |
| Sales of goods                | 216,622                                 | 324,405     | 582,362                         | 1,070,560   |
| <b>Total revenue</b>          | 1,566,550                               | 3,222,114   | 4,375,664                       | 9,955,190   |
| <b>Cost of revenue</b>        |                                         |             |                                 |             |
| Cost of service               |                                         |             |                                 |             |
| Digital Entertainment         | (208,360)                               | (374,783)   | (702,329)                       | (1,230,082) |
| E-commerce and other services | (611,637)                               | (1,235,351) | (1,743,773)                     | (3,825,826) |
| Cost of goods sold            | (212,841)                               | (301,252)   | (580,657)                       | (1,003,547) |
| <b>Total cost of revenue</b>  | (1,032,838)                             | (1,911,386) | (3,026,759)                     | (6,059,455) |
| <b>Gross profit</b>           | 533,712                                 | 1,310,728   | 1,348,905                       | 3,895,735   |

Source: Sea Limited, 2021 Filing


# Are all ecommerce businesses the same?

- **No, they don't.**
- Based on our observations in five different regions (Asia, Europe, Africa, North America, and South America), the treatment and performance measurements are highly affected by consumer behavior, business model, infrastructure and taxation in that country.
- In general, there are three different business models that any ecommerce platform can focus:




## Business Model: Take rate

- The key differentiation of this business model is that the ecommerce platform is not responsible for the handling of goods and delivery. The ecommerce platform acts as the primary custody that releases fund transfer once the transaction is completed and no dispute is raised by either merchant or buyer.
- Example of companies with this business model are: Bukalapak.com (BUKA), eBay (EBAY), Sea Limited (SE), Pinduoduo (PDD), Alibaba Group (BABA), Mercado Libre (MELI), etc. These companies primarily charge **“Platform Fee” as the percentage of total sales.**




# Business Model: Fulfillment

- The key differentiation of this business model is that the ecommerce platform handle the warehousing, order processing, delivery, and custody of the funds. In this business model, merchant can focus on producing goods available for sale, while the ecommerce platform handles the transfer of goods into end consumer.
- Example of companies with this business model: Amazon (AMZN), Overstock (OSTK), Coupang (CPNG), Ceconomy (CEC), Americana SA (AMER3), etc. **Net revenue is primarily calculated from total value of sales (or similar to GMV)**, while the cost of sales are calculated from the amount payable to the suppliers for the goods they provide. This business model can works especially well in the countries with no VAT or other variable taxes, or with large merchants who can handle professional taxation and VAT transfers.



# Business Model: Merchant solution

- The key differentiation of this business model is that the ecommerce platform doesn't even involved in the operational side of the online shop and not acting as custody of customer's fund. The business in this segment only acts as B2B service provider that enable merchant to set up white-label online shop and exclusive product catalogue.
- The most notable merchant solution service provide is Shopify (SHOP). This business primarily charges subscription fees for managing the domain registration, providing design template, ensuring uptime access to the website, and intermediary between merchant and payment gateway.



Recalling our earlier analysis on three different ecommerce business models, we can thus explore BUKA peers worldwide

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| North America          |                      |                   |            |                |
|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|------------|----------------|
| Ticker                 | Company Name         | Business Model    | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
| AMZN                   | Amazon.com Inc       | Fulfillment       | 1,640.43B  | 3.54           |
| EBAY                   | eBay Inc.            | Take rate         | 32.91B     | 3.26           |
| SHOP                   | Shopify Inc.         | Merchant solution | 98.20B     | 17.92          |
| ETSY                   | Etsy Inc.            | Take rate         | 18.80B     | 9.38           |
| OSTK                   | Overstock.com Inc.   | Fulfillment       | 2.26B      | 0.82           |
| NEGG                   | Newegg Commerce Inc. | Fulfillment       | 2.03B      | 1.16           |
| W                      | Wayfair Inc.         | Fulfillment       | 13.13B     | 0.80           |
| Average Price to sales |                      |                   |            | 5.27           |

| South America          |                    |                |            |                |
|------------------------|--------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| Ticker                 | Company Name       | Business Model | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
| MELI                   | Mercado Libre Inc. | Take rate      | 59.77B     | 8.45           |
| AMER3                  | Americanas SA      | Fulfillment    | 5.10B      | 1.09           |
| MGLU3.SA               | Magazine Luiza SA  | Fulfillment    | 7.94B      | 1.10           |
| Average Price to sales |                    |                |            | 3.55           |

## Recalling our earlier analysis on three different ecommerce business models, we can thus explore BUKA peers worldwide (cont'd)

*Nilzon Capital*

| Asia                   |                               |                |            |                |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| Ticker                 | Company Name                  | Business Model | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
| SE                     | Sea Limited                   | Take rate      | 68.35B     | 6.83           |
| PDD                    | Pinduoduo Inc.                | Take rate      | 49.23B     | 3.34           |
| BABA                   | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | Take rate      | 294.38B    | 2.27           |
| VIPS                   | Vipshop Holdings Limited      | Fulfillment    | 6.01B      | 0.33           |
| DADA                   | Dada Nexus Limited            | Take rate      | 2.21B      | 2.05           |
| CPNG                   | Coupang Inc.                  | Fulfillment    | 33.78B     | 1.83           |
| 4755                   | Rakuten Inc.                  | Take rate      | 12.71B     | 0.90           |
| Average Price to sales |                               |                |            | 2.51           |

| Europe                 |                  |                |            |                |
|------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| Ticker                 | Company Name     | Business Model | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
| CEC                    | Ceconomy AG      | Fulfillment    | 1.44B      | 0.04           |
| FTCH                   | Farfetch Limited | Take rate      | 5.46B      | 2.42           |
| ZAL                    | Zalando SE       | Fulfillment    | 14.81B     | 1.30           |
| Average Price to sales |                  |                |            | 1.25           |


| Africa                 |                       |                |            |                |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| Ticker                 | Company Name          | Business Model | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
| JMIA                   | Jumia Technologies AG | Take rate      | 0.78B      | 3.94           |
| Average Price to sales |                       |                |            | 3.94           |

# Tech stocks are under significant pressure in 2022

- After closing the year of 2021 almost on its all-time high, Nasdaq kicked off 2022 with a sharp downturn.
- The jump in US Government treasury yield, following the record-inflation in 40 years, putting massive pressure on unprofitable tech start-ups.
- Many Asian ecommerce and tech stocks can't escape the November-March rout, including SE (-66%), BABA (-40%), GRAB (-78%), PDD (-57%), and BUKA (-60%)


## QQQ ETF P/E Ratio

### HISTORICAL P/E RATIO



Source: Altavista

## SE P/S Ratio



Source: Refinitiv

## US 10-year Treasury Yield

U.S. 10 Year Treasury (US10Y:Tradeweb)



CNBC

Source: CNBC

## BABA P/S Ratio

Price to Sales: 1.9  
5-Year Average: 9.3  
S&P 500 Index Average: 2.7  
Online Services Industry Average: 2.8




Source: Refinitiv

# Valuation Benchmark: Sea Limited's Price/Sales multiples for top range

- Prior to IPO, BUKA primary business is to provide digital commerce services through its primary website Bukalapak.com by allowing third-party merchants to list their product in the site in exchange for commission (usually percentage of sales).
- IPO enables BUKA to unlock huge potential for growth that they may never see by staying private, including investing in other companies to create vertical/horizontal synergy.
- After the IPO, we see BUKA starts to execute the expansion plan by acquiring businesses that are diverge from its core business: digital banking, gaming, merchant solutions, and private education.
- Based on that, we consider that BUKA is heading into the same direction with Sea Limited (SE), which already has Garena, Shopee, and SeaMoney.
- Here are some other considerations:
  - BUKA businesses today is resembling to those of SE;
  - BUKA serves the same demographic user base, primarily in Indonesia (and for SE, South East Asia); and
  - Both ecommerce business are expected to grow significantly, fueled by internet adoption and massive funding from investor.
- For those reasons, it is rational for investors to use SE valuation as benchmark in valuing BUKA, since SE is the poster child of future BUKA and already a worldwide publicly-listed ecommerce.

## Sea Limited's Three Primary Businesses



Source: Sea Limited

## Sea Limited's 2022 Management Outlook

 **\$2.9 - \$3.1** Billion  
Digital Entertainment Bookings

 **\$8.9 - \$9.1** Billion  
E-commerce GAAP revenue

 **75.7%**  
YoY growth at midpoint

 **\$1.1 - \$1.3** Billion  
Digital Financial Services  
GAAP revenue

 **155.4%**  
YoY growth at midpoint

Source: Sea Limited

# Valuation Benchmark: Weighted-average Price/Sales multiples from companies with similar business model for bottom range

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- In order to make a careful assessment on BUKA risk/reward potential, we see that it is important for investors to expand their view on how the peers are doing in global capital market, especially when domestic market is lacking of similar businesses.
- **By setting a bottom price range, it doesn't mean that the company is not good and uninvestable. In fact, history has proven that the reward from investment in high-growth company is likely to be fruitful in the future, as long as the company able to deliver market expectation.**
- We see that the weighted-average P/S multiples from the same "take rate" business model may be relatively the fairest valuation benchmark to set bottom pricing.
- **Weighted-average P/S multiples is calculated by putting into consideration each company's market cap to the calculation. By using this weighted-average method, investors can neutralize the impact of outliers that may – in fact – has limited operational size and relevance in the market.**
- As a side note, apart from the table on your right, BUKA current P/S is around 14.34x using estimated 2021 FY forward revenue and around 8.96x using estimated 2022 FY forward revenue.

## Weighted-Average P/S Multiples of "Take Rate" Ecommerce


| Ticker           | Company                       | Market Cap | Price to Sales |
|------------------|-------------------------------|------------|----------------|
| EBAY             | eBay Inc.                     | 32.91B     | 3.26           |
| ETSY             | Etsy Inc.                     | 18.80B     | 9.38           |
| MELI             | Mercado Libre Inc.            | 59.77B     | 8.45           |
| SE               | Sea Limited                   | 68.35B     | 6.83           |
| PDD              | Pinduoduo Inc.                | 49.23B     | 3.34           |
| BABA             | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | 294.38B    | 2.27           |
| DADA             | Dada Nexus Limited            | 2.21B      | 2.05           |
| 4755             | Rakuten Inc.                  | 12.71B     | 0.90           |
| FTCH             | Farfetch Limited              | 5.46B      | 2.42           |
| Weighted Average |                               |            | <b>2.85</b>    |

Source: Refinitiv, Company 10-K, Google Finance

# Analysts are estimating BUKA to book IDR 3.08 trillion revenue in 2022, a 51% CAGR from 2020

- Based on data surveyed by Refinitiv from 11 analysts, the mean revenue estimates for BUKA is at IDR 1,926 billion for 2021 and **IDR 3,081 billion for 2022**. We will use this data to support our indicative pricing.
- What caught our intention is, actually the fact that the mean analysts' EPS expectation for both 2021 and 2022 are actually trending more positive (they expect BUKA will deliver better financial results than previously estimated). However, they cut the target price by -22% in just 90 days. Analysts seem to be both optimistic and pessimistic at the same time.

## Analyst Revenue Estimates on BUKA



Source: Refinitiv

|                   | 2021   | 2022   |
|-------------------|--------|--------|
| Mean              | 1,926B | 3,081B |
| High              | 2,003B | 3,759B |
| Low               | 1,844B | 2,555B |
| Forecasted Growth | --     | --     |
| # of Analysts     | 11     | 11     |

## Historical Analyst Price Target

| MEAN ESTIMATE TREND            |            |         |           |           |                 |
|--------------------------------|------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|
|                                | Q<br>21-12 | Q<br>-- | Y<br>2021 | Y<br>2022 | Price<br>Target |
| Current                        | -2.733     | --      | -11.940   | -9.697    | 836.00          |
| 30 Days Ago                    | -2.733     | --      | -11.670   | -9.752    | 836.00          |
| 90 Days Ago                    | -2.733     | --      | -20.300   | -13.810   | 1,070.00        |
| % Change (90 Days)             | 0.0%       | --      | 41.2%     | 29.8%     | -21.9%          |
| Current Fiscal Year End: 21-12 |            |         |           |           |                 |
| Next Expected Report Date: --  |            |         |           |           |                 |

Source: Refinitiv

## Analyst Recommendations on BUKA

| ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS                |   |
|----------------------------------------|---|
| I/B/E/S Mean: <b>Buy</b> (12 Analysts) |   |
| Strong Buy                             | 5 |
| Buy                                    | 5 |
| Hold                                   | 2 |
| Sell                                   | 0 |
| Strong Sell                            | 0 |

Source: Refinitiv

# Given all available current information, the relative fair value for the next 12 months is...



In making the following calculation, we match **BUKA's forward 2022 FY estimated revenue of IDR 3.08 trillion** (from analysts average estimate) with **current P/S multiples** of respective valuation benchmark to make room for favorable valuation and minimize the risk of being too pessimistic.

## Top Range

By using Sea Limited's current P/S multiples of 6.83x and market's estimation for 2022 FY revenue of IDR 3.08 trillion, the indicative top range for BUKA market cap is around IDR 21.04 trillion, or **IDR 204/share**.

## Bottom Range

By using market's weighted-average current P/S multiples of 2.85x and market's estimation for 2022 FY revenue of IDR 3.08 trillion, the indicative bottom range for BUKA market cap is around IDR 8.77 trillion, or **IDR 85/share**.

Valuation is an art and shall not be taken as your only consideration in making investment decisions. Nilzon Capital doesn't issue stock recommendation. Any calculation in this page is served as information only and shall not be taken/used as solicitation to buy, hold, or sell any securities mentioned.

# 06

## Appendix

# About Nilzon Capital



- An investment and wealth advisory firm based in Indonesia.
- Registered and supervised by Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Republic of Indonesia.
- Established in 2020 during the worst economic crisis since The Great Depression of 1929.
- Led by a highly-skilled management team with years of experience and certified qualification in investment banking and asset management.
- **We provide asset allocation advisory through stocks, ETF, fixed income securities, and alternative investments.**

## Advisor Profile:

### Frizon Akbar Putra (Principal Advisor, President)

Indonesian citizen, currently 29 years old. License holder of WMI No. No. KEP-210/PM.211/WMI/2016, WPEE No. KEP-18/PM.212/WPEE/2017, and WPPE No. KEP-397/PM.212/WPPE/2016.

Highly experienced in the capital market and investment banking business since the start of his career at PT RHB Sekuritas Indonesia in 2015 through 2021. Experienced in handling 11 IPO from various industries, involved in the issuance of Rp20 trillion bonds & sukuk, and engaged in various regulatory discussion with OJK, BI, and capital market SROs.

Currently member of Association of Indonesian Investment Manager Representatives and Association of Indonesia Capital Market Professionals.

Graduated with bachelor's degree in Accounting from Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia in December 2014.

### John Octavianus (Principal Advisor)

Indonesian citizen, currently 37 years old. License holder of WPEE No. KEP-45/BL/WPEE/2011.

Highly experienced in the capital market and investment banking business for more than 10 years. Currently also serving as President Director at PT Marvel Investama Asia since 2019 and as CEO at PT OrigN Teknologi Indonesia since 2021. Previously served as Head of Investment Banking at PT UOB Kay Hian Sekuritas (2018-2019), Vice President Investment Banking at PT RHB Sekuritas Indonesia (2016-2018), Senior Manager Investment Banking at PT UOB Kay Hian Sekuritas (2013-2016), Senior Manager Investment Banking at PT Maybank Kim Eng Sekuritas (2012-2013), and Associate at PT Indo Premier Sekuritas (2010-2012).

Graduated with bachelor's degree in Accounting from Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia in 2008 and passed CFA Level 2 exam.

# Nilzon Capital Key Person Ownership



| Key Person                | Role                         | Ownership in PT Bukalapak.com Tbk. |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| PT Nilzon Kapital Advisor | Company                      | No                                 |
| Frizon Akbar Putra        | Principal Advisor, President | No                                 |
| John Octavianus           | Principal Advisor            | No                                 |

All key persons may or may not increase/decrease their ownership in the company mentioned at anytime after the date of issuance of this article.

**This article is written by:**

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Emily Stephanie Wijaya

Yewon Choi

## We love to hear your opinion



We would like to hear your opinion, suggestion, and constructive feedbacks in order to make our services and publication better. You can send us an email to:

[buka@nilzoncapital.com](mailto:buka@nilzoncapital.com)

We value your time spent on reading this report and provide feedbacks. However, we provide no guarantee that your email may be responded to in full, in part, or not responded at all due to our internal policy and capacity.

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